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A growing body of research that investigates the influence of emotions on negotiation
processes and outcomes (for a review, see Barry, Fulmer, & Goates, 2006; Li & Roloff,
2006) suggests that the ability to manage emotions before, during, and following a
negotiation is an important negotiation skill. Whether emotions that surface in a negoti-
ation are integral to the task or carried over from prior events (Lerner & Keltner, 2000),
negotiators inevitably encounter their own felt and displayed emotions, as well as emo-
tions displayed by their counterparts. We suggest that emotion management is a domain
of expertise that allows negotiators to leverage the benefits of emotions and avoid their
potential pitfalls. A negotiator may want to leverage emotions because they can serve as
sources of strategic information (e.g., Forgas, 2001; Van Kleef, De Dreu, & Manstead,
2004a) and influence (e.g., Barry, 1999; Forgas, 2001; Kopelman, Rosette, & Thompson,
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This article conceptualizes emotion management as a
form of negotiation expertise, and integrates the nascent
empirical literature on emotion in negotiation with con-
cepts from the learning sciences literature to suggest how
negotiation expertise in emotion management (NEEM)
can be taught. We argue that NEEM differs from emo-
tional intelligence in fundamental ways, and that it con-
sists of sensitivity to strategically relevant emotional cues,
ability to strategically display and respond to emotions in
negotiations, and the inclination to manage emotions for
superior objective and subjective negotiation perfor-
mance. We propose a method of developing NEEM in
the classroom and identify directions for future research.
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emotions through strategic display of one’s own emotions (Barry, 1999; Frank, 1988;
Kopelman et al., 2006) and strategic response to emotions displayed by others (Kopel-
man, Gewurz, & Sacharin, 2008), is a skill that can be taught. In this article, we
conceptualize emotion management in negotiation as a form of expertise, review
relevant research, identify gaps in the current state of knowledge on emotion manage-
ment in negotiations, and propose a method of developing such expertise in a classroom
setting.
Negotiation Expertise in Emotion Management
We conceptualize emotion management as a form of expertise. Expertise is defined
as reproducible superior performance in a given domain (Ericsson, Krampe, &
Tesch-Römer, 1993). Expertise in emotion management in negotiations entails leverag-
ing one’s own and the other party’s emotions to maximize absolute economic outcomes,
subjective evaluation of relative outcomes (Loewenstein, Thompson, & Bazerman, 1989;
Messick & Sentis, 1985), and subjective social perceptions not only of instrumental
outcomes, but also of feelings about the self, feelings about the negotiation process, and
feelings about the relationship (Curhan, Elfenbein, & Xu, 2006).
Negotiation Expertise in Emotion Management (NEEM) differs qualitatively from
models of emotional intelligences (EI) that are trait-based (e.g., Petrides & Furnham,
2001) or have trait components (e.g., Goleman, 1995). It does so because a fundamental
assumption of NEEM is that domain-specific emotion management is learned and, in
principle, teachable. NEEM is more closely related to ability-based EI (e.g., Mayer &
Salovey, 1997; see Petrides & Furnham, 2000, for more on the distinction between types
of EI) in that NEEM is similar to Mayer and Salovey’s four ability branches of EI (the
ability to perceive emotions accurately, use emotion to facilitate thought, understand
emotion, and manage emotions). However, NEEM differs from ability-based EI in that
(a) it is domain-specific, (b) its sensitivities and abilities develop from and do not
merely use domain-specific knowledge, (c) it can be learned, but takes significant time
and effort to do so, and finally, (d) it has a motivational component.
First, whereas EI is a general ability, NEEM is a domain-specific form of consistent
superior performance. Mayer, Salovey, and Caruso (2004) cite Sternberg, Weschler, and
others in characterizing intelligence as ‘‘primarily a capacity to carry out abstract
thought, as well as the general ability to learn and adapt to the environment’’ (p. 198).
Expertise, in contrast, is fundamentally grounded in a constrained content domain, and
thus is not a general ability. Expertise may transfer to closely related tasks, though the
further the task is from the domain, the less relevant is the expertise. Although the
acquisition of NEEM would almost certainly be facilitated (and accelerated) by high
trait or ability-based EI, to conflate NEEM and EI would be to ignore over 60 years of
expertise literature that grew out of de Groot’s (1965) seminal work in the 1940s
showing expert performance cannot be explained by intelligence or general problem-
solving ability.
Second, whereas EI is a stable aptitude that draws on knowledge, in NEEM domain
knowledge leads to the development and refinement of domain-specific sensitivities and
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abilities. Mayer et al. (2004) point out that ‘‘EI is a relatively stable aptitude, whereas
emotional knowledge—the kind of emotional information that emotional intelligence
operates on—is relatively easy to acquire and teach’’ (p. 209). Although NEEM too
relies on emotional knowledge, this knowledge is not ‘‘operated’’ on by a stable apti-
tude. Instead, knowledge leads to the development of domain-specific pattern recogni-
tion and problem-solving strategies.
Third, in contrast to Mayer, Salovey, and Caruso’s claim that emotional knowledge is
easy to acquire and teach, expertise takes time to develop. The degree of knowledge
acquisition, consolidation, and integration needed to develop the kind of sensitivities
and abilities required for expert performance typically involves at least 10 years of delib-
erate practice, or pushing the limits of one’s knowledge and performance (Ericsson et al.,
1993). Clearly, students cannot be expected to become expert negotiators after a semes-
ter-long course. However, they can begin to develop their expertise (Dreyfus & Dreyfus,
1986). We later propose an effective teaching approach that both establishes in students
the core knowledge and dispositions of NEEM, and also helps instill in them the dispo-
sition for deliberate practice.
Finally, deliberate practice involves motivation (see Hatano & Inagaki, 1986, on two
types of expert learning motivation). In contrast, EI does not include a motivational
component. In fact, the inclination to use one’s general intelligence has been found to
be distinct from intelligence itself (e.g., Stanovich & West, 2000), suggesting that the
same might be true of emotional intelligence. Ultimately, the difference between an
intelligence and an expertise can be illustrated by what it takes to perform a surgery. To
become a surgeon, an individual must be intelligent (in addition to having other quali-
ties). However, a surgeon’s performance does not boil down to her intelligence: Without
the domain-specific knowledge, sensitivities, and abilities developed through years of
deliberate practice, she could not perform a complex surgery successfully.
These distinguishing characteristics of NEEM suggest that it is not so vulnerable to
the criticisms levied against EI, such as being too broad and vague a construct to be
meaningful (Locke, 2005), measuring knowledge of emotion, not actual performance
(Brody, 2004), or simply indicating conformity to a cultural standard. Moreover, the
few studies that examined the role EI on negotiation outcomes have not been encourag-
ing. Using a unidimensional measure of EI, Foo, Elfenbein, Tan, and Aik (2004) found
that EI was related to greater integrative performance in a negotiation, but lower distrib-
utive performance, suggesting that negotiators high in EI were agreeable and able to
create value, but less able to claim it. This is partly echoed in Mueller and Curhan
(2006), who used Mayer, Salovey, and Caruso’s (2002) multi-dimensional measure of EI
and found that only a negotiator’s understanding of emotion was related to her coun-
terpart’s postnegotiation positive mood, outcome satisfaction, liking the negotiator, and
being willing to negotiate with her again. These findings suggest that EI is like general
intelligence and problem-solving ability in that it does not account for expert
performance.
We define NEEM along four core dimensions: knowledge, sensitivities, abilities, and
inclinations. Beyond the basic domain-specific knowledge that is the foundation of any
expertise, we draw on Perkins, Jay, and Tishman’s (1993) concept of disposition—the
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tendency to deliberately engage in effective practices—as a framework to characterize
the components of NEEM. The three elements of disposition are sensitivity, ability, and
inclination. Sensitivity is a relatively automatic, perception-like pattern recognition that
cues a given beneficial practice (e.g., noticing the emotional displays of the other negoti-
ator that convey strategic information). The sensitivity of NEEM goes beyond the mere
recognition of emotions to noticing contextually embedded emotions that are salient to
maximizing utility at a given point in a negotiation. Thus, it is one thing to recognize
anxiety in general, but quite another to integrate that basic recognition with domain
knowledge to see the possible causes and strategic significance of anxiety at different
stages of a negotiation. Second, ability is the capacity to execute a given practice (e.g.,
alleviating a counterpart’s anxiety in different ways), and not merely the capacity to
describe how to execute it. Finally, inclination is the tendency to consistently execute a
practice (e.g., overcoming one’s anxiety about anchoring; Rosette & Kopelman, 2008).
Taken together, sensitivity directs an expert’s perception, ability gives her the capacity
to consistently achieve superior performance, and inclination is what drives the expert
to do so and to continue to improve (i.e., learn) over time. Next, we draw on research
findings in the negotiation and emotion literatures to suggest a few examples of sensitiv-
ities and abilities important to NEEM. The inclination to use these will depend in part
on how their development is encouraged in the classroom, which we treat in the subse-
quent section on teaching NEEM.
NEEM Sensitivities
Key emotion management sensitivities in negotiations include, but are not limited to:
(a) awareness that emotions are present at different stages of the negotiation and related
to specific strategies, (b) identification of discrete emotions as they occur during a nego-
tiation, and (c) gauging the intensity of a felt or displayed emotion. Research suggests
that people across cultures experience, display, and recognize six basic emotions: anger,
disgust, fear, sadness, surprise, and happiness (Ekman, Friesen, & Ellsworth, 1972), and
that, whether positive or negative, emotions vary in intensity (Barrett & Russell, 1998;
Larsen & Diener, 1992). In contrast to enduring mood, which is considered a diffuse
psychological state, emotion is defined as a short-lived differentiated affective response
to a specific situation (e.g., Barry, 1999; Schwarz & Clore, 1996). Emotions are either
triggered by an identifiable event or brought on as a means to achieving an aspired end.
According to appraisal theories (e.g., Frijda, 1986; Roseman, 1984; Scherer, 1984; Smith
& Ellsworth, 1985), emotions result from immediate evaluations of a given situation.
Identifying one’s own emotions may come naturally to some negotiators, whereas
others may need to develop this sensitivity. Identifying emotions actually felt by the
other party is usually more challenging because the other negotiator may attempt to
conceal these emotions. Furthermore, one’s own emotional state can influence the per-
ception of others’ emotions. For example, sad people will identify sadness-congruent
words faster and will perceive arguments with a sad tone as more persuasive than argu-
ments with an angry tone, because sad emotions are congruent with their current per-
sonal reality (Niedenthal, Halberstadt, & Setterlund, 1997). Thus, identification of
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discrete emotions is fundamental, but not enough. One also benefits from a sensitivity
to the influence of one’s own emotions on one’s perception of the other parties’ emo-
tions, as well as a sensitivity to when negotiation events elicit specific emotions. Like-
wise, a negotiator would benefit from a sensitivity to anticipate how the other party
may interpret her own emotional display.
A negotiator should benefit from being aware of emotions, identifying his own and
others’ emotions, and gauging the intensity of these emotions because emotions in
negotiations convey relevant information (e.g., Forgas, 2001; Van Kleef, De Dreu, &
Manstead, 2004b) and can strategically influence behavior (e.g., Barry, 1999; Forgas,
2001; Kopelman et al., 2006). These sensitivities build the foundation of emotion man-
agement; without these emotion management sensitivities there would be no cues to
guide the use of emotional management abilities.
NEEM Abilities
We conceptualize three types of NEEM abilities: (1) attribution of recognized emotions,
(2) strategic display of emotions, and (3) strategic response to displayed emotions.
Attribution of Recognized Emotions
The emotion as social information model (EASI; Van Kleef et al., 2004b) suggests that
emotions serve an important role because they communicate information about strategic
elements of the negotiation. Furthermore, emotions also convey important information
about how a negotiator thinks. Emotions can be differentiated along several appraisal
dimensions, such as responsibility, control, and urgency. For example, anger and happi-
ness differ with regard to who is held responsible for the situation, how much personal
control is felt, and whether the experience includes a sense of urgency to act (Ellsworth
& Scherer, 2003), which have consequences for strategic choices in negotiations. It is
also important to appraise whether the emotion felt or expressed during the negotiating
process is integral to the given negotiation task or incidental; emotions may be carried
over from an unrelated event to the current negotiation situation (Lerner & Keltner,
2000). For example, if anger is incidental to the negotiation, it would not necessarily
communicate information about a negotiator’s satisfaction with the level of concessions
on price, even though it could be misconstrued as doing so. On the other hand, inci-
dental anger would communicate relevant relational information about the state of
mind of the angry party, which, while also salient, requires a different course of action.
Research provides insights about how unmanaged emotions tend to influence negotia-
tors, as well as the negotiation process. For example, angry people have a tendency to
blame others (Quigley & Tedeschi, 1996) and are likely to attribute higher responsibility
to other parties when situations are ambiguous and open to interpretation (Keltner,
Ellsworth, & Edwards, 1993). Furthermore, angry people are likely to have a strong
desire to take action against others (Mackie, Devos, & Smith, 2000), which may lead
them to take punitive actions against those who may not be the source of their anger
(Goldberg, Lerner, & Tetlock, 1999; Lerner, Goldberg, & Tetlock, 1998).
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In contrast, happy people are likely to feel relatively certain about the course of
events, for example, during the negotiation process, and feel in control, and thus more
likely to assume personal responsibility for the outcome (Ellsworth & Scherer, 2003).
Thus, with respect to appraisals of control and to some extent certainty, a happy person
and an angry person would be expected to behave similarly. A happy person differs
from an angry person, however, in her tendency to take action in that she would not be
likely to attribute responsibility of the situation to others and may therefore sense little
urgency for change. Happy people are also less likely to take high risks (Isen & Patrick,
1983), whereas angry people are more likely to engage in risk-seeking choices (Lerner &
Keltner, 2001), have a tendency to behave optimistically about the likelihood of future
positive events, and perceive less risk of future negative events (Lerner, Gonzalez, Small,
& Fischhoff, 2003; Lerner & Keltner, 2000). Finally, although a happy person is likely to
experience less urgency to act, a happy person is more likely to engage in prosocial
helping behavior (Batson, 1990; Batson, Coke, Chard, Smith, & Taliaferro, 1979). This
may lead happy negotiators to be perceived as more trustworthy. Indeed, others view
angry negotiators as less trustworthy than those who are happy or sad (Dunn &
Schweitzer, 2005). Clearly, research is still needed to determine how such emotional
dynamics play out in negotiations.
Some of the above attributions of emotions occur automatically, and even some experi-
enced negotiators may be unaware of them. To effectively manage emotions in negotia-
tions would therefore require a better understanding of what attributions and tendencies
are likely to occur if emotional dynamics are allowed to play out. Active intervention may
be necessary to leverage these attributions strategically. For example, ‘‘I realize that I’m
angry and have an urgency to act immediately, but I will hold myself back and wait until
tomorrow to make a decision.’’ At the very least, a negotiator will benefit from being aware
of the dynamics that take place. For example, ‘‘I really want to make the decision now, and
that’s probably because I’m angry and have an urgency to act.’’
Strategic Display of Emotion
The strategic display of one’s own emotion is an important emotion management ability
that may involve a conscious decision about whether and how to express a genuinely
felt emotion, or feign (i.e., generate, amplify, or suppress) a desired emotion as a source
of influence (e.g., Barry, 1999; Forgas, 2001; Kopelman et al., 2006). For example,
toward the end of the negotiation, a negotiator who is pleased with the outcome is
likely to feel happy. Mindlessly expressing this genuine happiness can have beneficial or
damaging consequences. If a negotiator’s happiness is attributed by her counterpart to
the successful joint effort to create value in the current negotiation, it may set the stage
for a productive future business relationship (Kopelman et al., 2006). In contrast, if the
counterpart interprets this expression of happiness through a distributive mindset, it
may signal to her that he made too many concessions (i.e., if she is happy, she got the
better deal and I lost). Worse still, if the expression of happiness is interpreted as gloat-
ing, it may damage the long-term relationship (Thompson, Valley, & Kramer, 1995).
Thus, by strategically choosing whether and how to display genuinely felt emotions of
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happiness at the end of the negotiation, the negotiator can protect herself against dis-
advantageous attributions of her emotions.
It can also be a strategic choice to feign an emotion, that is convincingly generate
and display an emotion that would not have otherwise been felt at that moment. For
example, even if a negotiator is not happy at the onset of a negotiation, it may be bene-
ficial to feign happiness. To elicit a convincing display of happiness, a negotiator could
focus on an intrinsic or extrinsic idea that leads her to feel genuinely happy at that
moment, and express this happiness with regards to the opportunity to work together
and explore joint gains.
In sum, one mark of emotion management expertise is the ability of a negotiator to con-
sciously adjust her emotional display to serve her objectives. One way to do this is by
amplifying or suppressing an authentically experienced emotion. Another way is to feign a
strategically advantageous positive or negative emotion (Hochschild, 1983; Rafaeli & Sut-
ton, 1991). Whether authentic or feigned, strategically displayed emotions can function as
behavioral persuasion tactics that lead to desired outcomes. For example, display of anger
can be financially advantageous to a negotiator with high power, since others are likely to
concede to his or her demands (Sinaceur & Tiedens, 2006; Van Kleef et al., 2004a).
Although in situations such as power asymmetry, low information, or under the operation
of an agreement bias, displaying discontent and anger (e.g., pounding one’s fist on the
table) leads the other party to make concessions during the negotiating process (e.g., Rafa-
eli & Sutton, 1991; Sinaceur & Neale, 2005; Van Kleef et al., 2004a), it also can boomerang.
Under certain conditions, anger may lead to a conflict spiral. The other party might react
by also feeling and displaying anger (Barsade, 2002; Hareli & Rafaeli, 2008; Hatfield,
Cacioppo, & Rapson, 1992), and angry negotiators are more likely to use competitive strat-
egies (Forgas, 1998) and over-retaliate (Allred, 1999; Daly, 1991). Displaying anger in cul-
tures such as the U.S. and East Asia reduces the likelihood that one’s offer will be accepted
by increasing the likelihood of a spiteful response by the other party (e.g., Kopelman &
Rosette, 2008; Kopelman et al., 2006; Pillutla & Murnighan, 1996), and thus may lead to a
negotiation impasse (Friedman et al., 2004).
In contrast, strategic display of positive emotion, such as happiness, facilitates the
development of reciprocal long-term relationships in potentially integrative settings
(Kopelman et al., 2006), and in East Asian cultures tends to increase the likelihood of
closing a favorable deal in distributive settings (Kopelman & Rosette, 2008). In general,
happy negotiators are more likely to share information and have an increased preference
for and adoption of cooperative negotiation strategies (Baron, 1990; Forgas, 1998) that
lead to value creation and better joint outcomes (Carnevale & Isen, 1986).
Strategic Response to Displayed Emotion
Strategically choosing one’s own response to the emotions displayed by the other party
is also an important emotion management ability (Kopelman et al., 2008). When con-
sidering the emotions of the other party, a negotiator may begin by assessing whether
or not they are authentic. Emotions are considered authentic when internally experi-
enced and externally displayed emotions align (Côté, 2005).
Potworowski and Kopelman Negotiation Expertise in Emotion Management
Volume 1, Number 4, Pages 333–352 339
Despite the fact that there has been relatively little empirical testing, experienced media-
tors and skilled negotiators have found some strategic responses to be useful for managing
emotionally charged negotiations. Strategic responses such as venting (e.g., Lewicki, Saun-
ders, & Minton, 1999) and cooling-off periods (e.g., Ury, 1993; Ury, Brett, & Goldberg,
1988), as well as addressing the core concerns of the emotional party (Fisher & Shapiro,
2005) are believed to help overcome negative emotion. This, in turn, leads to more collab-
orative and successful win-win negotiated outcomes, and directs positive emotion toward
constructive information exchange and mutually beneficial outcomes (Kopelman et al.,
2008). Gottman and DeClaire’s (2001) work on building better relationships seems espe-
cially salient, and future research could examine whether exercises they suggest (e.g., the
emotional communication game) could be adapted to benefit negotiators. Likewise, future
research should examine the effectiveness of the recommendations Adler, Rosen, and
Silverstein (1998) make on how to deal with one’s own and other’s anger and fear—the
two most potent emotions confronting negotiators, they argue.
The basic assumption in the nonempirical negotiation literature is that only negative
emotion is problematic and serves as an obstacle to successful negotiations (Kopelman
et al., 2008). The literature indirectly suggests that positive emotion would always signal
that the underlying concerns of the other party have been addressed. In terms of Fisher
and Shapiro’s (2005) elements of emotion, expressed happiness would indicate that affil-
iation had been properly established, autonomy respected, status acknowledged, and
a fulfilling role had been chosen. Cooperation and beneficial agreements would then
be expected to ensue. However, empirical research on decision making in negotiation
settings suggests that in some situations where these core concerns are met, such as
when negotiating in the context of close relationships (McGinn, 2006), negotiators may
be less focused on expanding the pie because they are focused more on dividing
resources equally (Messick, 1993; Thompson & DeHarpport, 1998). Their need to avoid
relationship conflict (Jehn, 1995) may lead them to make nonstrategic concessions and
miss opportunities to discover differences in priorities that could be leveraged to expand
the pie. In the end, positive emotions not only can present obstacles for optimal
economic outcomes, but their effects may be especially difficult to manage because
positive emotions are an intrinsically desirable state.
Ultimately, NEEM involves the ability to distinguish between situations where positive
and negative emotions displayed by the other party are beneficial, detrimental, or irrele-
vant, to the negotiator’s utility. This would inform the negotiator’s choice of a strategic
response that could better harness and perhaps amplify the other party’s emotion or, in
contrast, attempt to dispel and overcome the obstacles the other party’s emotion pre-
sents. Once a negotiator assesses whether a strategic response would harness or dispel
the other party’s emotions, an appropriate behavioral response (e.g., ignoring their
emotion, allowing them to vent, confronting them) can be adopted.
Teaching NEEM
To learn to manage emotions in negotiations, students need to experience emotions in
the context of negotiations. Rather than focus solely on how to charge classroom negoti-
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ations with more emotion, we propose a principled, theory-driven, and evidence-based
approach to developing emotion management expertise. If all three elements
(sensitivities, abilities, and inclinations) are built into a negotiation course, students are
less likely to leave with inert knowledge, and more likely to change their negotiation
practice to bridge what Pfeffer and Sutton (2000) call the ‘‘knowing-doing gap.’’ The
upshot is that the extent to which a course incorporates a learning process that acceler-
ates the development of negotiation dispositions, it accelerates the development of nego-
tiation expertise in emotion management.
Helping students of negotiation develop the fundamentals of NEEM rests on the
assumption that, at the very least, emotion management sensitivities and abilities can be
improved, and that the inclination to use them takes root within the timeframe of a
course. However, for students to continue to develop their NEEM they would need to
leave a course with a second disposition: to learn from the negotiations they experience
outside the classroom. This second, self-directed learning disposition is the key to keep-
ing emotion management inclinations labile enough so that, through deliberate practice,
students can continue to adjust and refine their emotion management sensitivities and
abilities following the negotiation course. The disposition to continue learning is espe-
cially important because managers are increasingly changing jobs, as well as being asked
to negotiate in multi-cultural contexts where the sensitivities and abilities that are func-
tional in one’s own culture may be dysfunctional in another. Given that negotiation is
fundamental to effective management, it is one domain where the call for evidence-
based practice in management (Rousseau, 2006; Rousseau & McCarthy, 2007) can most
easily be answered.
Our approach to teaching NEEM is based on a system that integrates key principles of
current educational theory to make learning more effective. Effective emotion manage-
ment learning results in the development of NEEM through (a) heightened and more
contextually discriminating sensitivities, (b) consistently superior execution of emotion
management abilities, and (c) the inclination (i.e., the habit) of executing these abilities
in practice. Moreover, the use of this approach also structures and encourages increas-
ingly self-directed learning, thus developing students’ disposition to continue the develop-
ment of their NEEM through reflective practice following the course. The approach
centers on a deliberately cyclical learning structure (see Bransford, Brown, & Cocking,
1999; Potworowski, Vath, & Shah, 2006), in contrast to the traditionally linear approaches
Figure 1. The learning cycle and changes across cycles.
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to learning that may have incidental cyclical components (Nadler, Thompson, & van
Boven, 2003). The cyclical learning structure (see Figure 1) follows five steps: (a) intro-
duction of the problem, (b) activation of prior knowledge, (c) broadening of perspective,
(d) organizing knowledge for use, and (e) assessing learning performance.
In cyclical learning, the focal sensitivities and abilities introduced and practiced in
one cycle are systematically developed, refined, and combined with others in subsequent
cycles. In principle, with each cycle students’ knowledge becomes richer and more inte-
grated, their sensitivities become more refined, their abilities develop, and their inclina-
tion to manage emotions is further reinforced. The opportunities to experience,
practice, reflect on, and develop sensitivities and abilities are most beneficial when they
arise in varied (Lowenstein, Thompson, & Genter, 2003) and increasingly challenging
contexts. Thus, as students’ NEEM develops, their growing capacity to deal with and
learn from more complex, subtle, and varied negotiation contexts is challenged at each
cycle with developmentally appropriate problems. Meanwhile, they internalize the cycle
as the way to systematically learn from negotiations, and in so doing become better pre-
pared to leverage their negotiations experiences outside the classroom to further develop
their expertise (Bransford & Schwartz, 1999).
To begin the emotion management learning cycle, emotional sensitivities can be high-
lighted as early as the introductory session of a negotiation course. Highlighting emo-
tion sensitivities alongside the core teaching of negotiation strategy will attune students
to the role emotions can play in negotiations. The cycle could begin, for example, with
a simple distributive negotiation where one of the key lessons learned is the value of
anchoring with the first offer. The first step of the cycle can be incorporated into the
negotiation debrief by posing the following problem to students: Should you make the
first offer? Why or why not? Note that by asking for justification, the ensuing discussion
will naturally lead to the second part of the cycle as students activate prior knowledge,
beliefs, and experiences. The instructor can then highlight the emotional component
(i.e., anxiety about making the first offer) and can guide students in exploring whether
they felt anxious, what cues, if any, they perceived about their counterpart’s emotion,
and what they did about it.
After discussing cues that indicate anxiety (e.g., beating around the bush), the instruc-
tor can highlight research findings showing that individuals who make the first offer
experience increased anxiety that leads to decreased satisfaction with the negotiation,
which sours the higher economic returns of this strategy (Rosette & Kopelman, 2008).
This can help motivate the need to develop the ability to strategically respond to
anchoring anxiety. To broaden students’ perspectives on the problem, one can then
either capitalize on differing opinions about whether and how to deal with anchoring
anxiety (e.g., visualization of anchoring beforehand, practicing making first offers,
exploring reasons for one’s anxiety, taking a deep breath; research is needed to confirm
whether these methods are effective in this context) and note empirical findings that
show that an objective benchmark for the financial value of the first offer reduces anxi-
ety (Rosette & Kopelman, 2008). To move from multiple perspectives to the fourth
stage, organizing knowledge for use, the different perspectives can be listed and their
costs, benefits, effectiveness, and contextual relevance explicitly compared. The discus-
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sion can then shift to a more prescriptive phase. Note the same pattern can be followed
in parallel to address other emotional outcomes of anchoring, such as responding to
outrageous first offers (e.g., to help save face and get the negotiation on track), or
avoiding the winner’s curse.
The various emotions and their respective appropriate strategic responses can be inte-
grated around the anchoring ‘‘event,’’ making it an ‘‘emotions by event’’ organization of
knowledge for use. Although one can also organize ‘‘events by emotion’’ (e.g., all the nego-
tiation-related events when one can experience anxiety), emotions lack the narrative struc-
ture of series of events, and would thus make the learning less memorable. That said, it is
worth helping students develop a rich network of associations, and one can do so by con-
necting previous lessons (e.g., ‘‘how does this relate to what we learned about dealing with
anxiety about anchoring?’’). Finally, assessing learning performance can come in the form
of written self-reflections for homework and anchoring behavior in the next cycle.
In addition to actual negotiation simulations, one can teach NEEM by providing
explicit models. For example, one could approach teaching strategic response to
emotion in negotiation by showing a clip from a relatively short video of a negotiation
(e.g., Kaufer & Kellman, 1991) in which the negotiators display subtle, but potentially
consequential, emotions. One could then ask the class an open-ended question about
what they noticed in this exchange. After eliciting from students a list of attributes they
noticed, one could ask what an expert should be looking for or noticing about the
emotions, and why. This would give the instructor a sense of what students believe they
should be noticing in a negotiation, and consequently an idea of what questions to ask
to steer the discussion and lesson so students’ beliefs are made more accurate. The
instructor can then open up a discussion by asking specific questions about the
emotional states of the negotiators, including, for example, cues that indicated specific
emotions. The exercise can be taken a step further by running the next segment of the
video and stopping just before one of the parties engages an emotion management
response tactic. One can then ask students a ‘‘what now?’’ question to start a discussion
about how and why they would respond to the emotions in a particular way. Finally,
one could broaden perspectives by following up on student responses to the ‘‘what
now?’’ question with ‘‘what if’’ questions to explore potential consequences of proposed
actions and slightly different scenarios. By pointing to relevant research, the instructor
can then help students organize evidence-based knowledge for strategic use.
To assess performance, one could use a second video clip (e.g., from a movie, a video
of an actual negotiation, or one created for the purpose), and at one point hand out
roles that mirror those in the video. Students would then role-play the next step in the
negotiation. This type of exercise has several benefits. First, it can help each student see
some of her own emotion management strengths and weaknesses, as well as those of
her peers. This is not only valuable information to help individualize the course, but it
also helps students identify who in the classroom—ideally structured as a community of
practice (Brown & Duguid, 1991; Lave & Wenger, 1991)—can help them improve spe-
cific sensitivities and abilities. Second, in a diverse classroom, the range of sensitivities
and proposed strategic responses to emotions can also broaden perspectives by revealing
in concrete ways individual, gender, and cultural variations. Finally, the instructor can
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use the exercise as the first in a number of experiences that illustrate the importance of
being able to understand who your counterpart is and adapt to him. This involves a
conceptual change from thinking of oneself as (desiring to be) a specific and narrow
kind of negotiator (e.g., tough and uncompromising), to thinking of oneself as a flexible
negotiator who is sensitive to a counterpart’s emotions and capable of accommodating
him to one’s advantage or the advantage of both parties.
As students begin to understand what makes them feel a certain way in a negotiation,
why, and what can be done, they can begin to consider the emotions of their counter-
parts. By explicitly considering emotions through perspective taking over the course of
several cycles, students will become increasingly sensitive to what makes their counter-
parts feel anxious in negotiations (e.g., how they can anticipate or behaviorally identify
other parties’ anxiety, understand why counterparts are anxious, and what can be done).
The same is true, of course, for any other emotion, though, given the limited time allot-
ted to teaching NEEM, the instructor may want to focus on counter-intuitive findings
(e.g., some of the potential disadvantages of happiness). Finally, to help students inte-
grate the different clusters of organized knowledge produced over the course of several
learning cycles, students can be asked to build an inventory of strategic responses to dif-
ferent emotions (e.g., as part of a final assignment). Such an inventory could consist
of a list of their own felt and displayed emotions, the assessment of other’s felt and
displayed emotions, and their potential causes, assessment tactics, and actions.
Students can learn to display emotions strategically in a number of ways. One
approach is to use a simulation in which they are coached to intentionally display emo-
tions. Such a simulation would allow students to see their own and each others’ (naı̈ve)
beliefs, and how (under)developed their sensitivities and abilities might be. Research
suggests that negotiators can express a desired emotion and that the behavioral display
of the emotion, like other strategies in their negotiation tool kit, may serve as a means
to attain a desired outcome (Kopelman et al., 2006). Deliberate regulation of emotion
may involve different levels of acting (Côté, 2005; Grandey, 2000; Gross, 1998; Hochs-
child, 1983). In deep acting, internally experienced and externally displayed emotions
are aligned and therefore considered authentic. At other times, however, the negotiator’s
emotional strategy may be at odds with how he or she feels at that moment. This type
of emotional regulation is called surface acting, and because it influences only the dis-
play of emotion, not the internal experience of emotion, it is considered to be inauthen-
tic (Côté, 2005). Whether the strategic behavioral display of emotion represents
emotions psychologically experienced at that moment (i.e., the negotiator strategically
‘‘harnesses felt emotions,’’ perhaps exaggerating them as he displays them) or whether it
represents deliberately feigned emotion (i.e., the negotiator ‘‘wears an emotional mask,’’
hiding her current feelings), some negotiators can intentionally adjust their emotional
display in a desired direction by either amplifying or suppressing their own experienced
emotion (Hochschild, 1983; Levenson, 1994).
Adopting a coaching manipulation that consisted of a page of expert advice on why
it would be advantageous to display a particular emotion throughout the negation, Kop-
elman et al. (2006) confirmed that it is even possible for novice negotiators (e.g., MBA
students) to convincingly display positive and negative, in contrast to neutral, emotions
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in a socially interactive face-to-face negotiation simulation. This coaching technique was
replicated and extended to anger by Sinaceur and Tiedens (2006) and thus offers a
viable strategy for producing emotional interactions in classroom settings. This research
suggests that the strategic display of positive or negative emotions by one negotiator led
to the emergence of positive or negative emotional contagion. Interestingly, whether the
degree of the displayed emotion was accurately judged by the other party was
contingent on the emotion displayed. When negotiators displayed positive emotion, the
opposing party accurately judged the emotional display as positive–that is, there was
congruence between what the target negotiator believed she displayed and what the focal
negotiator judged; however, when negotiators displayed generally negative emotion the
negotiator believed she was more negative than judged by the opposing party (Kopel-
man et al., 2006). This suggests that when negotiators strategically choose to display
negative emotion they may be likely to overestimate how others perceive the intensity of
that emotion. Alternatively, they may be overconfident in their ability to display
negative emotion, perhaps experiencing more emotion than they actually displayed,
which would be consistent with research that showed that experienced negative emo-
tions were related to expression only for people with dispositionally high expressivity
(Gross, John, & Richards, 2000) and suggests that negative emotion may be relatively
difficult to feign. More research is needed to understand the factors influencing the
perception of emotional intensity.
Ethical Considerations of NEEM
It is important to recognize that NEEM, especially the strategic display of emotion, can
involve deception. Two earlier examples—displaying anger to try to gain concessions
and suppressing incidental frustration and displaying happiness to help encourage
positive rapport and the creation of mutual gains—illustrate this well. Deception, or
intentionally misleading one’s counterpart, raises ethical questions—ones that many
teachers of negotiation believe are important to discuss in class (Lewicki, 1983). It is
clear that NEEM can be abused for illegal and unethical ends; however, being incapable
of emotion management is also costly. We propose that using the learning cycle to teach
NEEM includes raising students’ awareness and experience of the ethics of deception.
Ultimately, students will apply their NEEM in a way that resonates with their values. If
the instructor integrates the discussion of the ethics of deception into the learning cycle,
then students will be more sensitive to the legal, practical (e.g., reputational), and ethical
ramifications of engaging in deception.
Following the learning cycle to discuss the ethics of deception might unfold as
follows. First, pose the problem—when and how is it acceptable to deceive (with
emotions) in a negotiation? This might arise naturally while teaching dispute resolution.
One might explore students’ prior knowledge and beliefs about emotional deception
and get them to generate a variety of criteria to judge whether a legal act of deception
is ethically acceptable or not. These might include religious or philosophical positions
that make prescriptions (e.g., utilitarianism), or involve mental simulations, such as
imagining the consequences of having one’s deceptive act described in a newspaper
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(Lax & Sebenius, 1986). These criteria can serve as a good starting point for a discussion
to broaden perspectives on the ethics of deception, which should raise important
questions about the boundary conditions of what counts as deception. For example,
does the strategic display of a generated emotion count as an act of deception? Can the
end (e.g., better relationship) justify emotional deception as the means? To help stu-
dents organize knowledge for use, one might turn to Robinson, Lewicki, and Donahue’s
(2000) typology of deception. Alternatively, Shell’s (2007) chapter on the different
schools of bargaining ethics (i.e., poker, idealist, and pragmatist) can help students dis-
cover with which, if any, school they identify, and the corresponding conditions under
which the strategic display of emotion would be acceptable. One way to test learning at
some later time in the class might involve seeing how thoughtfully students respond to
hypothetical vignettes involving strategic emotional display.
Conclusion
We conceptualized negotiation expertise in emotion management (NEEM) and illustrated
how it can be taught in the context of a negotiation course. We reviewed the empirical
research on beneficial and detrimental influence of emotions on the negotiation process
and outcomes with respect to the development of NEEM. We proposed that enabling
students to develop and apply emotion management sensitivities and abilities in a safe
learning environment will encourage the development of inclinations to apply them in
negotiations and to continue to develop their NEEM beyond the classroom. To build
NEEM, we suggested a learning cycle that involves a systematic way of posing problems,
and expanding student understanding through simulations and exercises. We encouraged
evidence-based discussions of the effects of emotions in negotiations, the value of emo-
tions as a source of strategic information, the impact of emotions as a behavioral influence
tactic, and the advantages and risks of managing different emotions, including the ethical
implications of doing so. We encourage not only empirical research on the gaps in our
knowledge of the effects of emotions on negotiations, but also research on how emotions
can be strategically managed in negotiations (e.g., Kopelman et al., 2006, 2008). To apply
this research to the development of NEEM requires more and better teaching materi-
als—ones that can enhance the effect of the learning cycle so that students of negotiation
are well equipped to deal with both the economic elements of a negotiation and the intri-
cacies of emotions that are integral to social interactions.
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